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his policy brief argues that the 
decentralisation of Serbia by degating 
more authority to municipalities could 
benefit minority groups that constitute a local 
majority. Although there are three such minority 
communities living in Serbia, the Bosniaks in 
Sandzak, the Albanians in Presevo Valley and the 
Hungarians in Vojvodina, the paper focuses on the first 
two groups, because their problems could potentially 
destabilise Serbia and the wider region. Thus, 
addressing the root causes of tensions in these two 
regions is an urgent task. Moreover, not only would 
minorities gain from sound decentralisation – all 
municipalities would do so regardless of ethnicity. 
Ultimately, decentralisation would be an essential step 
in Serbia’s democratisation process, following the 
example of other Central and East European countries. 
I. Minority grievances as a potential 
source of soft security threats 
Serbia has recently returned to the international 
spotlight, mostly because of the Kosovo issue and the 
country’s lack of cooperation with the Hague Tribunal. 
While sufficient attention has been given to resolving 
tensions between ethnic Albanians and the Serbian 
minority in Kosovo, the grievances of ethnic 
minorities within Serbia have gone mostly unnoticed 
by the international community. Although the 
problems of Serbia’s national  minorities do not 
compare with the gravity of the situation in Kosovo, 
the EU’s 2006 Progress Report
1 on Serbia recognises 
that the political situation remains tense in southern 
Serbia and Sandzak, which are home to Serbia’s 
Albanian and Bosniak communities respectively.  
Developments on the ground also indicate that 
problems relating to the situation of these two 
minorities continue to pose soft security threats to 
Serbia and to the wider region. While in southern 
Serbia inter-ethnic tensions are still pronounced, in 
                                                 
1 See European Commission, Serbia 2006 Progress 
Report,  Commission Staff Working Document, 
COM(2006) 649 final, Brussels, 8 November 2006. 
Sandzak political divisions within the Bosniak 
community cause instability.  
In January 2006, Albanian councillors of the 
municipalities of Presevo, Bujanovac and Medvedja 
adopted a common political platform in which they 
“commit to [the] unification of Presevo Valley with 
Kosovo in case of…possible change of [Kosovo’s] 
borders”.
2 In June 2007, Jonuz Musliu, deputy chief of 
the Bujanovac municipality, called on the leaders of all 
the Albanian political parties from Bujanovac and 
Presevo to form a joint National Council, which could 
represent Albanian aspirations to join Kosovo.  
I believe it is time to form a National Council 
which would adopt a joint platform, with which 
we would start negotiations with the Serbian 
government about merging the Bujanovac and 
Presevo municipalities with Kosovo.
3 
Although southern Serbia is peaceful at the moment, 
fighting is not such a distant memory for the Valley’s 
Albanians. Their 17 months of insurgency came to an 
end in May 2001, but small-scale incidents continued 
in 2002 and 2003. 
While the Albanians of Presevo Valley are 
contemplating the idea of pushing for secession, 
Sandzak Bosniaks’ demands for autonomy also 
resurface occasionally. In 2002, upon the drafting of 
                                                 
2 Derived from the platform document, “Albanian 
Councillors of Presheva Valley (Preshevo, Bujanovac and 
Medvedja) in Meeting Held on 14 January 2006 in 
Preshevo”, 2006 (document in the author’s possession).  
3 See the article “Valley Albanians push for talks on the 
merger of Kosovo”, B92 news website, 6 June 2007 
(etrieved from http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics-
article.php?yyyy=2007&mm=06&dd=06&nav_category=
93&nav_id=41632). 
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the constitution of the State Union of Serbia and 
Montenegro, Bosniaks argued for the designation of 
Sandzak as an autonomous territorial and political unit 
within the common state. Hopes for establishing a 
unified Sandzak region across the borders of Serbia 
and Montenegro vanished after the State Union 
disintegrated, but the List for Sandzak (a coalition of 
Bosniak parties that participated in Vojislav 
Kostunica’s previous government until 2006) 
continues to stand for administrative and territorial 
autonomy for Sandzak, with wide-ranging powers to 
include the regional police and judiciary.
4 
Nevertheless, in Sandzak, the most dangerous sources 
of insecurity are infighting among local political 
bosses (which is often marked by violence), organised 
crime (which has penetrated political structures), 
widespread drug use among the youth and the 
disturbing presence of the radical Wahhabi group. 
Owing to weak local government autonomy, the 
central government has been able to play off local 
political rivals within the Bosniak community against 
one another, contributing to the escalation of tensions 
and to the destabilisation of municipal governments. If 
the grievances of the Bosniak community are not 
addressed, there is a danger of further nationalist and 
religious radicalisation. Moreover, the region could 
potentially turn into a hub of organised crime, with 
perpetual low-scale violence.  
It is argued here that the Serbian government could 
reduce existing ethnic tensions by increasing local 
government autonomy. This move would be a simple 
and effective way to address some of the everyday life 
problems of minorities. As the decision on Kosovo’s 
status is approaching, it is likely that solutions 
implying any kind of territorial autonomy or 
federalisation would be unacceptable to the Serbian 
authorities. Yet decentralisation at the municipal level 
could be a feasible option, which would  please not 
only minorities, but also all municipalities regardless 
of ethnicity, as it would empower local communities 
and increase the accountability of local governments. 
The most important next step would be to transfer 
public property to municipal governments to enable 
them to play a larger role in upgrading the 
infrastructure in their areas and to contribute to local 
economic development. The Serbian government 
should also further extend the sphere of local 
competencies, which would strengthen local 
ownership over public services. 
II. Minority rights in Serbia 
In principle, minorities are granted far-reaching rights 
in Serbia, including the right to preserve their 
language, culture and national identity; to receive 
education in their mother tongue until high school; to 
use their national symbols; to obtain public 
                                                 
4 Derived from an interview with Esad Džudžević, 
President of the Bosniak National Council, Novi Pazar, 
12 August 2006. 
information in their languages; and to have appropriate 
representation in the public sector. The law on national 
minorities provides a sound legal basis for the 
protection of minority rights in Serbia and grants 
minorities cultural autonomy. It allows them to set up 
minority councils through which they can “exercise 
their rights of self-government regarding the use of 
language and script, education, information and 
culture”.
5 The major provisions of the law on national 
minorities were also enshrined in the new Serbian 
constitution adopted in late 2006. Yet, problems are 
arising with the implementation of the law, which 
often falls short of the rights granted in principle. 
While minorities are increasingly vocalising the need 
for more ethnic-territorial autonomy, their grievances 
centre on daily life problems, such as under-
representation in the public sector, lack of economic 
development, higher rather average unemployment and 
obstacles that prevent the implementation of the 
cultural and language rights granted by law. Here too 
the strengthening of local autonomy would be a way to 
respond to these grievances, which could reduce 
tensions and marginalise potential irredentists.  
Still, it should be stressed that decentralisation is not a 
panacea and would not solve all the problems 
minorities are facing, so it should be complemented by 
further measures. School curricula should reflect the 
multi-ethnic character of Serbia, hate speech and 
ethnocentric views spread by the media or school 
textbooks should not be tolerated, and minorities 
should be included into the police and judiciary in 
higher numbers, just to name a few examples that 
would be equally important to create a more minority-
friendly atmosphere in Serbia. Better representation of 
minorities in the police and judiciary is crucial, as 
these institutions are often perceived as being 
insensitive to minorities’ problems. The weak response 
by the judiciary and police was at least partly 
responsible for the increase in inter-ethnic incidents in 
2003 and 2004 in Vojvodina, thus the integration of 
minorities into the police and the courts is strongly 
recommended, as it could raise the level of trust 
between minorities and the state.
 6 
III. Problems encountered by minorities 
Most of the problems facing minorities, especially in 
Sandzak and southern Serbia, are related to poverty 
and economic underdevelopment. Sandzak and 
southern Serbia are among Serbia’s most economically 
                                                 
5 See Art. 19 of the Law on Protection of Rights and 
Freedoms of National Minorities, Official Gazette of the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), No. 11, 
27.02.2002, translated by the OSCE Mission to FRY. 
6 For further information on this point, see Florian Bieber 
and Jenni Winterhagen, Ethnic Violence in Vojvodina: 
Glitch or Harbinger of Conflicts to Come?, ECMI 
Working Paper No. 27, European Centre for Minority 
Issues, Flensburg, Germany, April 2006 (retrieved from 
http://www.ecmi.de/download/working_paper_27.pdf).   
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depressed areas, with per capita annual income a third 
of the Serbian average. Unusually high unemployment 
rates (estimated at around 60-70% in southern Serbia,
7 
and at around 30% in Sandzak
8), neglected 
infrastructure and a lack of economic prospects 
continue to be serious destabilising factors. A history 
of discriminating state policies means that grievances 
often gain an ethnic interpretation. The recently 
growing popularity of Wahhabism among Sandzak 
Muslims, who traditionally practice a moderate version 
of Islam, has also been blamed on the dire economic 
circumstances by local analysts. Mehmed Slezovic, co-
chair of the non-governmental organisation Sandzak 
Intellectual Circle, has argued that the single most 
important local factor behind the growing number of 
Wahhabi followers is the region’s economic crisis: 
“Jobs are hard to come by for young people who are 
then exposed to various influences – they are easy prey 
both for drug dealers and religious fundamentalists.”
9 
Similarly, Belgrade mufti Muhamed Jusufspahic has 
maintained that “unemployment, political conflicts and 
increasing numbers of drug addicts” have created 
fertile ground for the spread of Wahhabism in Novi 
Pazar.
10  
Similarly, Albanian secessionist aspirations are also 
fuelled mostly by growing impatience with the lack of 
economic progress and Albanians’ lack of integration 
into the public sector. As explained by a local 
Albanian politician in relation to why the Albanians of 
Presevo Valley want to join Kosovo, “six years after 
the end of the conflict in this region, nothing has 
changed in the political and economic sense, except for 
the forming of multi-ethnic police”.
11 Despite recent 
efforts by the state, ethnic minorities remain strongly 
under-represented in most institutions under central 
control (among them the post office, tax authorities, 
land registry, social institutions, healthcare centres, 
customs services, state inspection bodies, the police 
and the judiciary). This situation implies that public 
sector jobs are less available to them, and as a result, 
minority languages are rarely used in official 
communications within these state bodies and 
                                                 
7 The rate was 60% in Bujanovac and 70% in Presevo; 
see International Crisis Group (ICG), Southern Serbia in 
Kosovo’s Shadow, Europe Briefing No. 43, ICG, 
Brussels, 27 June 2006, p. 7. 
8 The figure was 35% in Novi Pazar; see ICG, Serbia’s 
Sandzak: Still Forgotten, Europe Report No. 162, ICG, 
Belgrade/Brussels, 8 April 2005, p. 35. 
9 See Amela Bajrovic,  “Wahhabism Fuels Novi Pazar 
Religious Tensions”, Balkan Insight, No. 62, 6 December 
2006 (retrieved from http://www.birn.eu.com/en/ 
62/10/1844/?ILStart=20). 
10 Ibid. 
11 See the B92 website article “Valley Albanians push for 
talks on the merger of Kosovo” (2007), op. cit. 
agencies, even if theoretically a minority language is in 
official use locally.
12 
It should also be noted that since Bosniak, Albanian 
and Hungarian parties have begun to participate in 
municipal governments the problem of ethnic 
disproportion has decreased in local administration and 
in those areas that are under local authority.  
IV. Obstacles hampering local government 
autonomy 
Given that Sandzak and Presevo Valley are among the 
poorest areas in Serbia, removing the existing barriers 
to local economic development is essential. The single 
biggest problem for local governments in Serbia is the 
fact that they do not own any property. Municipalities 
only have usage rights on public property owned by 
the state, which severely limits the viability of local 
governments. The European Council in its 2006 
European Partnership document called on Serbia “to 
adopt and implement decentralisation reform ensuring 
[the] viability of local governments”.
13 That being 
said, the new constitution does mention the category of 
municipal property, which may be a promising sign of 
future devolution. 
In Serbia, the lack of ownership rights for municipal 
governments hampers local economic development in 
two ways. First, it discourages the much-needed 
upgrading of local infrastructure and public services, 
which would  be a prerequisite for attracting 
investment and creating favourable conditions for 
private businesses. Second, local administrative 
procedures tend to be slow and complicated, putting 
unnecessary barriers in the way of potential investors. 
Municipal authorities have to obtain the consent of 
central authorities on all major decisions related to 
public property.
14 Sometimes the procedure can take 
years, which can jeopardise potential investments. 
                                                 
12 According to the law on official language use, the 
language of a minority becomes official in a municipality 
if that minority makes up at least 15% of the population 
or if the proportion of all national minorities reaches 10% 
of the population. Nevertheless, the law also allows 
municipalities to recognise a language as official if the 
proportion of a minority group in question is below 15%. 
Hungarian, for example, is official in 30 municipalities 
out of the 45 municipalities in Vojvodina. 
13 See European Council, Council Decision 2006/56/EC 
of 30 January 2006 on the principles, priorities and 
conditions contained in the European Partnership with 
Serbia and Montenegro including Kosovo as defined by 
the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 of 
10 June 1999 and repealing Decision 2004/520/EC, OJ L 
35/32, 07.02.2006 (retrieved from http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2006/l_035/l_035200
60207en00320056.pdf). 
14 See the USAID’s Serbian Local Government Reform 
Program Newsletter, No. 12, September–December 2005 
(retrieved from http://www.slgrp.usaid.org.yu/).  
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The example of Tutin, the poorest municipality in 
Sandzak with a Bosniak majority population, 
demonstrates how the lack of property rights is 
restraining economic growth. In 2004, the municipality 
of Tutin applied to the Republic’s Property Directorate 
for approval to transfer usage rights of a piece of land 
to Orije MZ, a local community. The community 
wants to use the area for a €2 million investment, 
including the construction of a ski centre. This 
investment would boost tourism in the region as well 
as create 200 new jobs. It took two years for the 
municipality – where the annual income is 17% of the 
Serbian average – to obtain the consent of the 
Republic, thus delaying the project and economic 
activity.
15 
It should be stressed that property devolution in itself 
would not eliminate poverty and underdevelopment, 
but it would set up the necessary preconditions for 
infrastructure development in the area and local 
development in general. Local efforts should be 
accompanied by a balanced regional development 
policy – an aspiration that has already been adopted as 
one of the new government’s main priorities – and 
should also be backed by the EU’s technical and 
financial assistance. 
In addition, it can also be argued that some functions 
still under central control could be carried out more 
effectively locally. The literature on local government 
finance maintains that placing certain public services 
at the local level would lead to a quality and quantity 
of services that most closely matches the community’s 
preferences. In Serbia, municipal governments have no 
influence on the operations of the electricity, gas or 
telecommunications providers, which are run by state-
owned companies. Nor do they have any influence on 
area branches of Republic ministries or agencies.
16 The 
quality of some services might improve by delegating 
them to the local level, because local governments 
would then be directly responsible and would have a 
greater stake in service provision. 
One such sphere of competency is the ordering of land 
registers. The fact that real estate registries are in 
disarray and that many buildings have no property 
status is currently a serious problem hindering 
economic  development in Serbia. Under such 
circumstances, investors take a considerable risk upon 
buying any property, since there is no guarantee that 
the registries match real conditions. Moreover, the 
disorderly real estate registry makes urban and 
infrastructure investment planning difficult and 
complicated. Local governments have an obvious 
interest in clearing up the real estate registry and deed 
books, if they want to attract investors or carry out any 
kind of local development plan. Furthermore, since the 
                                                 
15 Ibid. 
16 Derived from correspondence with Dusan Vasiljevic, 
of the Serbian Local Government Reform Program, 25 
January 2007. 
collection of property tax was fully assigned to the 
local level, municipal governments have become 
especially interested in creating up-to-date cadastres 
and land registers. It would make sense, therefore, for 
local governments to have some kind of authority over 
land and deed registers, which are today entirely 
controlled by the state.
17  
The central government should also deal with property 
restitution, without which property ownership relations 
cannot be clarified. This issue was also stressed by the 
European Council’s latest European Partnership 
document in 2006. 
It should be also added here that local governments 
could manage more competencies only if they have 
sufficient administrative capacity. Therefore, the 
central government should assist local authorities in 
the process, providing them with the necessary 
technical expertise and know-how. Particular functions 
should be delegated to the local level only when a 
municipal government demonstrates its ability to 
handle such tasks. 
In Macedonia, during the recently launched 
decentralisation reform, several functions that used to 
be under central control were delegated to the local 
level gradually, including among others land registries, 
transport and communications, and public revenue 
offices. Often these functions remained delegated to 
local governments, meaning that the central 
government could check not only the lawfulness, but 
also review the appropriateness of actions taken in the 
performance of these duties. Nevertheless, as a result 
local governments gained direct insight into and 
influence over their functioning; moreover, from the 
beginning of 2007 the employees of these institutions 
have been paid from the local budget, which also 
means that hiring staff has become a local 
prerogative.
18  
It can be also presupposed that if local governments 
had authority over services and bodies currently under 
central state control, the quality of services would 
improve and the integration of minorities into those 
institutions would accelerate. A further, positive side 
effect would entail the opportunity to implement the 
official use of minority languages more widely. In 
those municipalities where minorities participate in 
local government, local authorities are more likely to 
make the necessary effort to foster conditions for the 
official use of minority languages and to integrate 
minorities into public institutions.  
Obviously, changing employment patterns involves a 
long process and cannot be done overnight. Recruiting 
                                                 
17 See the Handbook for Local Councillors, available on 
the website of the Standing Conference of Towns and 
Municipalities (retrieved from http://www.skgo.org/code/ 
navigate.php?Id=266), p. 51. 
18 Derived from an interview with Islam Yusufi of 
Analytica in Skopje, 18 September 2006.  
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more persons belonging to minorities into public 
institutions requires a range of affirmative action 
policies, including educational and training 
programmes.  
If local governments’ spheres of authority were to be 
extended, however, responsibility would lie more with 
them for fulfilling the need to integrate minorities into 
the public sector and implementing the official use of 
minority languages, and it would be less easy to blame 
the Serbian state for lack of progress.  
V. An opening policy window – The right 
moment to push for reforms 
After almost four months of political stalemate and 
just prior to the constitutional deadline, Serbia’s 
democratically oriented parties finally managed to 
reach a consensus about the new government. Given 
that Serbia has just gotten back on the democratic 
political track and has indicated its readiness to 
continue negotiations with the EU, this might be the 
right moment to push for further reforms, such as for 
the continuation of the decentralisation process, 
launched in 2002 by the adoption of a new Law on 
Local Self-Government.
19 As the UN Security Council 
is about to adopt a new resolution on Kosovo’s status, 
the EU has a clear interest in drawing Serbia closer 
with a view to preserving stability on its south-eastern 
borders. The EU has a stake in keeping Serbia on the 
pro-EU, democratic path, and seems willing to speed 
up Serbia’s accession process. As negotiations with the 
EU are underway, the window of opportunity is 
reopening to stimulate the continuation of the pro-EU 
political reforms in Serbia that were put on hold at the 
start of the government crisis in October 2006.  
Other reasons the EU should grab the opportunity now 
to push for reforms have been highlighted by the 
recent political crisis and the popularity of the Serbian 
Radical Party: the prevalence of democratic forces 
cannot be taken for granted, nor can the chance of a 
nationalist backlash be fully excluded. 
VI. Conclusions and recommendations 
Decentralisation would be a general public good for 
every local community, not just for minorities. 
Establishing meaningful local autonomy would require 
the Serbian government to proceed with the 
decentralisation reform through adopting further 
measures. The above-mentioned Law on Local Self-
Government was intended as a first step in a longer 
process, and was welcomed by the Council of Europe, 
according to which the law was good enough to 
provide an acceptable legal basis for local authority. 
Municipalities continue to face many difficulties, 
                                                 
19 See the Law on Local Self-Government, adopted by 
the Serbian Assembly on 14 February 2002 (Official 
Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, No. 9, 26.02.2002). 
however. A new Law on Local Government Finance,
20 
which came into force on 1 January 2007, entails 
greater fiscal decentralisation, but the necessary 
regulations on municipal property and management 
have not been adopted. The Standing Conference of 
Cities and Municipalities (SKGO), which is the largest 
organisation of local governments, prepared the draft 
law on municipal property, but passage of this law has 
been continually postponed by the government. 
Although the new Serbian constitution introduced the 
category of municipal property, it failed expectations 
for further decentralisation. Instead of strengthening 
local autonomy, the constitution increased the central 
government’s sway over local governments.  
The influence and pressure of the EU would thus be 
necessary for reforms to continue and further 
decentralisation to come. The requirement for greater 
decentralisation – meaning increasing the autonomy of 
local governments – should be put forward as a 
demand by the EU during its negotiations with Serbia.  
In summary, the following recommendations are made 
to Serbia and the EU: 
•  Serbia should continue with the decentralisation 
reform launched in 2002. The most important next 
step would be the devolution of property to 
municipal governments.  
•  Serbia should explore which further functions 
could be managed better locally. Several functions 
of vital importance for local communities are still 
under central state control, with their management 
personnel being appointed by the state, as in the 
case of hospitals, electricity providers, the audit 
office and post office, the gas provider, 
telecommunications providers, the inspection 
organisation, the land and deed registry, and the 
cadastre. Local authorities have no affect on the 
employment practices or the work of these bodies, 
and thus on the quality of services.  
•  As devolving more competencies to the local level 
requires sufficient local administrative capacity to 
manage these tasks, the government should work 
closely with the SKGO, the European Agency for 
Reconstruction, USAID and other stakeholders 
during the decentralisation process. SKGO has 
recently launched a project investigating how 
legislative impediments to local economic 
development in Serbia can be overcome, including 
analysing the legal changes needed. 
•  The recently adopted reforms related to the 
intergovernmental finance system – especially the 
introduction of property tax at the local level and 
the granting of local discretion over various tax 
rates – points in the direction of greater local fiscal 
                                                 
20 See the Law on Local Government Finance, document 
published in the Official Gazette of the Republic of 
Serbia, implemented as of 1 January 2007.  
6 | Beata Huszka 
autonomy. The implementation of these reforms 
should be closely monitored, as their credibility 
will be measured by how well they are carried out. 
•  Safeguard measures are needed, which guarantee 
that no local majority can overrule local 
minorities. Introducing the requirement of 
supermajorities could be a solution. 
•  Institutional mechanisms and safeguards need to 
be put in place to ensure that the appointments of 
individuals to various functions are based on merit 
and qualifications and not on party connections.  
•  Shared authority over the police between the 
central and the local government is also 
recommended. It would be desirable if cooperation 
between the local police and the municipal 
authorities were institutionalised. 
•  Revitalising the local economy and developing 
local infrastructure in Presevo Valley and Sandzak 
is crucial for creating lasting stability. The 
international community should provide financial 
and technical assistance to Serbia to carry out a 
balanced regional development policy, recognising 
that stabilising these areas is in the regional 
interest. 
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